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Abstract
We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games. Many natural zero-
sum games have exponentially many strategies, but highly structured payoffs. For example, in
the well-studied Colonel Blotto game (introduced by Borel in 1921), players must divide a pool
of troops among a set of battlefields with the goal of winning (i.e., having more troops in) a
majority. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications
from the U.S presidential election, to innovative technology competitions, to advertisement, to
sports. However, because of the size of the strategy space, standard methods for computing
equilibria of zero-sum games fail to be computationally feasible. Indeed, despite its importance,
only a few solutions for special variants of the problem are known.
In this paper we show how to compute equilibria of Colonel Blotto games.
Moreover, our approach takes the form of a general reduction: to find a Nash equilibrium
of a zero-sum game, it suffices to design a separation oracle for the strategy polytope of any
bilinear game that is payoff-equivalent. We then apply this technique to obtain the first polytime
algorithms for a variety of games. In addition to Colonel Blotto, we also show how to compute
equilibria in an infinite-strategy variant called the General Lotto game; this involves showing how
to prune the strategy space to a finite subset before applying our reduction. We also consider the
class of dueling games, first introduced by Immorlica et al. (2011). We show that our approach
provably extends the class of dueling games for which equilibria can be computed: we introduce
a new dueling game, the matching duel, on which prior methods fail to be computationally
feasible but upon which our reduction can be applied.
∗Supported in part by NSF CAREER award 1053605, NSF grant CCF-1161626, ONR YIP award N000141110662,
DARPA GRAPHS/AFOSR grant FA9550-12-1-0423, and a Google fa
1 Introduction
Computing a Nash equilibrium of a given game is a central problem in algorithmic game theory. It
is known that every finite game admits a Nash equilibrium (that is, a profile of strategies from which
no player can benefit from a unilateral deviation) [39]. But it is not necessarily obvious how to
find an equilibrium. Indeed, the conclusions to date have been largely negative: computing a Nash
equilibrium of a normal-form game is known to be PPAD-complete [16, 22], even for two-player
games [12]. In fact, it is PPAD-complete to find an 1
nO(1)
approximation to a Nash equilibrium [13].
These results call into question the predictiveness of Nash equilibrium as a solution concept.
This motivates the study of classes of games for which equilibria can be computed efficiently.
It has been found that many natural and important classes of games have structure that can be
exploited to admit computational results [15, 21, 30, 36]. Perhaps the most well-known example is
the class of zero-sum two-player games1, where player 2’s payoff is the negation of player 1’s payoff.
The normal-form representation of a zero-sum game is a matrix A, which specifies the game payoffs
for player 1. This is a very natural class of games, as it models perfect competition between two
parties. Given the payoff matrix for a zero-sum game as input, a Nash equilibrium can be computed
in polynomial time, and hence time polynomial in the number of pure strategies available to each
player [15]. Yet even for zero-sum games, this algorithmic result is often unsatisfactory. The issue
is that for many games the most natural representation is more succinct than simply listing a payoff
matrix, so that the number of strategies is actually exponential in the most natural input size. In
this case the algorithm described above fails to guarantee efficient computation of equilibria, and
alternative approaches are required.
The Colonel Blotto Game A classical and important example illustrating these issues is the
Colonel Blotto game, first introduced by Borel in 1921 [8, 9, 19, 20, 48]. In the Colonel Blotto game,
two colonels each have a pool of troops and must fight against each other over a set of battlefields.
The colonels simultaneously divide their troops between the battlefields. A colonel wins a battlefield
if the number of his troops dominates the number of troops of his opponent. The final payoff of
each colonel is the (weighted) number of battlefields won. An equilibrium of the game is a pair of
colonels’ strategies, which is a (potentially randomized) distribution of troops across battlefields,
such that no colonel has incentive to change his strategy. Although the Colonel Blotto game was
initially proposed to study a war situation, it has found applications in the analysis of many different
forms of competition: from sports, to advertisement, to politics [38, 34, 37, 14, 31, 32], and has
thus become one of the most well-known games in classic game theory.
Colonel Blotto is a zero-sum game. However, the number of strategies in the Colonel Blotto
game is exponential in its natural representation. After all, there are
(
n+k−1
k−1
)
ways to partition
n troops among k battlefields. The classical methods for computing the equilibra of a zero-sum
game therefore do not yield computationally efficient results. Moreover, significant effort has been
made in the economics literature to understand the structure of equilibria of the Colonel Blotto
game, i.e., by solving for equilibrium explicitly [47, 6, 7, 5, 45, 49, 42, 33, 26, 23, 32]. Despite
this effort, progress remains sparse. Much of the existing work considers a continuous relaxation
of the problem where troops are divisible, and for this relaxation a significant breakthrough came
only quite recently in the seminal work of Roberson [42], 85 years after the introduction of the
game. Roberson finds an equilibrium solution for the continuous version of the game, in the special
case that all battlefields have the same weight. The more general weighted version of the problem
remains open, as does the original non-relaxed version with discrete strategies. Given the apparent
1Or, equivalently, constant-sum games.
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difficulty of solving for equilibrium explicitly, it is natural to revisit the equilibrium computation
problem for Colonel Blotto games.
An Approach: Bilinear Games How should one approach equilibrium computation in such a
game? The exponential size of the strategy set is not an impassable barrier; in certain cases, games
with exponentially many strategies have an underlying structure that can be used to approach the
equilibrium computation problem. For example, Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel [29] show how
to compute equilibria for zero-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall. Immorlica et al. [27]
give an approach for solving algorithmically-motivated “dueling games” with uncertainty. Letchford
and Conitzer [35] compute equilibria for a variety of graphical security games. Each of these cases
involve games with exponentially many strategies. In each case, a similar approach is employed:
reformulating the original game as a payoff-equivalent bilinear game. In a bilinear game, the space
of strategies forms a polytope in Rn, and payoffs are specified by a matrix M : if the players play
strategies x and y respectively, then the payoff to player 1 is xTMy. It has been observed that
such bilinear games can be solved efficiently when the strategy polytope has polynomially many
constraints [11, 29]. In each of the examples described above, it is shown how to map strategies
from the original games to appropriate payoff-equivalent bilinear games, in which strategies are
choices of marginal probabilities from the original game. If one can also map a strategy in the
bilinear game back to the original game, then one has a polytime reduction to the (solved) problem
of finding equilibria of the bilinear game. In each of these prior works it is this latter step – mapping
back to the original game – that is the most demanding; this generally requires a problem-specific
way to convert a profile of marginals into a corresponding mixed strategy in the original game.
1.1 Our Contribution
We first show how to compute equilibria of the Colonel Blotto game. Like the works described above,
our method is to consider a payoff-equivalent bilinear game defined over a space of appropriately-
selected marginals (in this case, the distribution of soldiers to a given battlefield). However, unlike
those works, we do not explicitly construct a game-specific mapping to and from a polynomially-
sized bilinear game. We instead use a more general reduction, based on the idea that it suffices to
solve linear optimization queries over strategy profiles in a (potentially exponentially-sized) bilinear
game. In other words, equilibrium computation reduces to the problem of finding a strategy that
optimizes a given linear function over its marginal components. We apply our reduction to the
Colonel Blotto game by showing how to solve these requisite optimization queries, which can be
done via dynamic programming.
The reduction described above follows from a repeated application of the classic equivalence of
separation and optimization [24]. In more detail, we formulate the equilibrium conditions as an LP
whose feasibility region is the intersection of two polytopes: the first corresponding to the set of
strategies of player 1, and the second encoding payoff constraints for player 2. To find a solution of
the LP via Ellipsoid method, it suffices to design a separation oracle for each polytope. However,
as we show, separation oracles for the second polytope reduce to (and from) separation oracles for
the set of strategies of player 2. It therefore suffices to design separation oracles for the polytope
of strategies for each player, and for this it is enough to perform linear optimization over those
polytopes [24]. Finally, to convert back to an equilibrium of the original game, we make use of a
result from combinatorial optimization: the solution of an LP with polynomially many variables
can always be expressed as a mixed strategy with a polynomial-size support, and such a mixed
strategy can be computed using the separation oracles described previously [24].
The reduction described above is not specific to the Colonel Blotto game: it applies to any
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zero-sum game, and any payoff-equivalent bilinear form thereof. To the best of our knowledge,
this general reduction from equilibrium computation to linear optimization has not previously been
stated explicitly, although it has been alluded to in the security games literature2 and similar ideas
have been used to compute correlated equilibria in compact games [28]. In particular, it is notable
that one requires only a single linear optimization oracle, over the set of pure strategies, to both find
an equilibrium of the bilinear game and convert this to a mixed equilibrium in the original game.
We demonstrate the generality of this approach by considering notable examples of games to which
it can be applied. In each case, our approach either results in the first known polytime algorithm
for computing equilibria, or else significantly simplifies prior analysis. Finally, we note that our
approach also extends to approximations: given the ability to approximately answer separation
oracle queries to within any fixed error ǫ > 0, one can compute a corresponding approximation to
the equilibrium payoffs.
Dueling Games In a dueling game, introduced by Immorlica et al. [27], two competitors each
try to design an algorithm for an optimization problem with an element of uncertainty, and each
player’s payoff is the probability of obtaining a better solution. This framework falls within a natural
class of ranking or social context games [1, 10], in which players separately play a base game and
then receive ultimate payoffs determined by both their own outcomes and the outcomes of others.
Immorlica et al. argue that this class of games models a variety of scenarios of competitions between
algorithm designers: for example, competition between search engines (who must choose how to
rank search results), or competition between hiring managers (who must choose from a pool of
candidates in the style of the secretary problem).
Immorlica et al. [27] show how to compute a Nash equilibrium for certain dueling games, by
developing mappings to and from bilinear games with compact representations. We extend their
method, and show how to expand the class of dueling games for which equilibria can be efficiently
computed. As one particular example, we introduce and solve the matching duel. In this game,
two players each select a matching in a weighted graph, and each player’s payoff is the probability
that a randomly selected node would have a higher-weight match in that player’s matching than
in the opponent’s. Notably, since the matching polytope does not have a compact representation
[43], the original method of [27] is not sufficient to find equilibria of this game. We also illustrate
that our approach admits a significantly simplified analysis for some other dueling games previously
analyzed by Immorlica et al.
General Lotto Game Hart [26] considers a variant of the Colonel Blotto game, namely the
General Lotto game. In this game, each player chooses a distribution over non-negative real num-
bers, subject to the constraint that its expectation must equal a certain fixed value. A value is
then drawn from each player’s chosen distribution; the players’ payoffs are then functions of these
values. What is interesting about this game is that there are infinitely many pure strategies, which
complicates equilibrium computation. Nevertheless, we show that our techniques can be applied
to this class of games as well, yielding a polynomial-time algorithm for computing Nash equilibria.
It is worth mentioning that the General Lotto game is an important problem by itself, and its
continuous variant has been well studied in the literature (see, for example, [4, 44, 26, 18]).
Subsequent Work The algorithm proposed in this work is later improved and simplified in [3].
2Independently and in parallel with an earlier version of this work, Xu et al. [50] implicitly used a similar idea to
solve a class of Stackleberg security games.
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2 Results and Techniques
We present a general method for computing Nash equilibria of a broad class of zero-sum games.
Our approach is to reduce the problem of computing equilibria of a given game to the problem of
optimizing linear functions over the space of strategies in a payoff-equivalent bilinear game.
Before presenting our general reduction, we will first illustrate our techniques by considering
the Colonel Blotto game as a specific example. In Section 2.1 we describe our approach in detail
for the Colonel Blotto game, explaining the process by which equilibria can be computed. Then
in Section 2.2 we will present the general reduction. Further applications of this technique are
provided in Section 3 (for dueling games) and Appendix B (for the General Lotto game).
2.1 Colonel Blotto
Here, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an equilibrium of discrete Colonel Blotto
in its general form. We allow the game to be asymmetric across both the battlefields and the players.
A game is asymmetric across the battlefields when different battlefields have different contributions
to the outcome of the game, and a game is asymmetric across the players when two players have
different number of troops.
In the Colonel Blotto game, two players A and B simultaneously distribute a and b troops,
respectively, over k battlefields. A pure strategy of player A is a k-partition x = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xk〉
where
∑k
i=1 xi = a, and a pure strategy of player B is a k-partition y = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yk〉 where∑k
i=1 yi = b. Let u
A
i (xi, yi) and u
B
i (xi, yi) be the payoff of player A and player B from the i-th
battlefield, respectively. Note that the payoff functions of the i-th battlefield, uAi and u
B
i , have
(a+1)× (b+1) entries. This means the size of input is Θ(kab). Since Colonel Blotto is a zero-sum
game, we have uAi (xi, yi) = −u
B
i (xi, yi)
3. Note that we do not need to put any constraint on the
payoff functions, and our result works for all payoff functions. We also represent the total payoff
of player A and player B by hAB (x, y) =
∑
i u
A
i (xi, yi) and h
B
B (x, y) =
∑
i u
B
i (xi, yi), respectively. A
mixed strategy of each player would be a probability distribution over his pure strategies.
Theorem 1 One can compute an equilibrium of any Colonel Blotto game in polynomial time.
Proof: Let X and Y be the set of all pure strategies of players A and B respectively, i.e., each
member of X is a k-partition of a troops and each member of Y is a k-partition of b troops. We
represent a mixed strategy of player A with function p : X → [0, 1] such that
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1.
Similarly, let function q : Y → [0, 1] be a mixed strategy of player B. We may also use x and y,
instead of p and q, for referring to a mixed strategy of player A and B respectively. Since Colonel
Blotto is a zero-sum game, we leverage the MinMax theorem for finding an NE of the game. This
theorem says that pair (p∗, q∗) is an NE of the Colonel Blotto game if and only if strategies p∗ and
q∗ maximize the guaranteed payoff of players A and B respectively [46]. Now, we are going to find
strategy p∗ of player A which maximizes his guaranteed payoff. The same technique can be used for
finding q∗. It is known that for each mixed strategy p, at least one of the best-response strategies
to p is a pure strategy. Therefore, a solution to the following program characterizes strategy p∗.
max U (1)
s.t.
∑
x∈X px = 1,∑
x∈X pxh
A
B (x, y) ≥ U, ∀y ∈ Y,
3Note that in the Colonel Blotto game if uAi (xi, yi) is not necessarily equal to −u
B
i (xi, yi) then a special case of this
game with two battlefields can model an arbitrary 2-person normal-form game and thus finding a Nash Equilibrium
would be PPAD-complete.
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Unfortunately, LP 1 has |X | variables and |Y|+1 constraints where |X | and |Y|+1 are exponential.
We therefore cannot solve LP 1 directly.
Step 1: Transferring to a new space. We address this issue by transforming the solution space to a
new space in which an LP equivalent to LP 1 becomes tractable (See, e.g., [2], for similar technique).
This new space will project mixed strategies onto the marginal probabilities for each (battlefield,
troop count) pair. For each pure strategy x ∈ X of player A, we map it to a point in {0, 1}n(A)
where n(A) = k × (a + 1). For convenience, we may abuse the notation, and index each point
xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n(A) by two indices i and j such that xˆi,j represents xˆ(i−1)(a+1)+j+1. Now we map a pure
strategy x to GA(x) = xˆ ∈ {0, 1}
n(A) such that xˆi,j = 1 if and only if xi = j. In other words, if player
A puts j troops in the i-th battlefield then xˆi,j = 1. Let IA = {xˆ ∈ {0, 1}
n(A)|∃x ∈ X ,GA(x) = xˆ}
be the set of points in {0, 1}n(A) which represent pure strategies of player A. LetM(X ) andM(Y)
be the set of mixed strategies of players A and B respectively. Similarly, we map mixed strategy
x to point GA(x) = xˆ ∈ [0, 1]
n(A) such that xˆi,j represents the probability that mixed strategy
x puts j troops in the i-th battlefield. Note that mapping GA is not necessarily one-to-one nor
onto, i.e., each point in [0, 1]n(A) may be mapped to zero, one, or more than one strategies. Let
SA = {xˆ ∈ [0, 1]
n(A)|∃x ∈ M(X ),GA(x) = xˆ} be the set of points in [0, 1]
n(A) which represent at
least one mixed strategy of player A. Similarly, we use function GB to map each strategy of player B
to a point in [0, 1]n(B) where n(B) = k×(b+1), and define IB = {yˆ ∈ {0, 1}
n(B)|∃y ∈ Y,GB(y) = yˆ}
and SB = {yˆ ∈ [0, 1]
n(B)|∃y ∈ M(Y),GB(y) = yˆ}.
Lemma 1 Set SA forms a convex polyhedron with an exponential number of vertices and facets.
Now, we are ready to rewrite linear program 1 in the new space as follows.
max U (2)
s.t. xˆ ∈ SA (Membership constraint)
hAB (xˆ, yˆ) ≥ U, ∀yˆ ∈ IB (Payoff constraints)
where
hAB (xˆ, yˆ) =
k∑
i=1
a∑
ta=0
b∑
tb=0
xˆi,ta yˆi,tbu
A
i (ta, tb)
is the expected payoff of player A.
Step 2: Solving LP 2. The modified LP above, LP 2, has exponentially many constraints, but
only polynomially many variables. One can therefore apply the Ellipsoid method to solve the LP,
given a separation oracle that runs in polynomial time [25, 41]. By the equivalence of separation
and optimization [24], one can implement such a separation oracle given the ability to optimize
linear functions over the polytopes SA (for the membership constraints) and SB (for the payoff
constraints).
Stated more explicitly, given a sequence c0, c1, . . . , ck(m+1), where k is the number of battlefields
and m is the number of troops for a player, the required oracle must find a pure strategy x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xk) ∈ X such that
∑k
i=1 xi = m, and xˆ = G(x) minimizes the following equation:
c0 +
k(m+1)∑
i=1
cixˆi, (3)
and similarly for polytope Y. The following lemma shows that one can indeed find a minimizer of
Equation (3) in polynomial time.
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Lemma 2.1 Given two integers m and k and a sequence c0, c1, . . . , ck(m+1), one can find (in poly-
nomial time) an optimal pure strategy x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) where
∑k
i=1 xi = m, xˆ = G(x) and xˆ
minimizes c0 +
∑k(m+1)
i=1 cixˆi.
Proof: We employ a dynamic programming approach. Define d[i, t] to be the minimum possible
value of c0+
∑i(t+1)
i′=1 ci′ xˆi′ where
∑i
i′=1 xi′ = t. Hence, d[k,m] denotes the minimum possible value
of c0 +
∑k(m+1)
i=1 cixˆi. We have that d[0, j] is equal to c0 for all j. For an arbitrary i > 0 and t, the
optimal strategy x puts 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t units in the i-th battlefield and the applied cost in the equation
3 is equal to c(i−1)(m+1)+t′+1. Thus, we can express d[i, t] as
d[i, t] = min
0≤t′≤t
{d[i− 1, t− t′] + c(i−1)(m+1)+t′+1}.
Solving this dynamic program, we can find the allocation of troops that minimizes
∑
αixˆi in
polynomial time, as required.
Step 3: Transferring to the original space. At last we should transfer the solution of LP 2 to
the original space. In particular, we are given a point xˆ ∈ SA and our goal is to find a strategy
x ∈ M(X ) such that GA(x) = xˆ. To achieve this, we invoke a classic result of [24] which states that
an interior point of an n-dimensional polytope P can be decomposed as a convex combination of at
most n+1 extreme points of P , in polynomial time, given an oracle that optimizes linear functions
over P . Note that this is precisely the oracle required for Step 2, above. Applying this result to
the solution of LP 2 in polytope SA, we obtain a convex decomposition of xˆ into extreme points of
SA, say xˆ =
∑
i αixˆi. Since each xˆi corresponds to a pure strategy in X , it is trivial to find point
xi with GA(xi) = xˆi, since the marginals of each xˆi lie in {0, 1}. We then have that x =
∑
i αixi is
the required mixed strategy profile.
Combining these three steps, we find a Nash Equilibrium of the Colonel Blotto game in poly-
nomial time, completing the proof of Theorem 1. See Appendix A for more details.
2.2 A general framework for bilinear games
In our method for finding a Nash Equilibrium of the Colonel Blotto game, the main steps were
to express the game as a bilinear game of polynomial dimension, solve for an equilibrium of the
bilinear game, then express that point as an equilibrium of the original game. To implement the
final two steps, it sufficed to show how to optimize linear functions over the polytope of strategies in
the bilinear game. This suggests a general reduction, where the equilibrium computation problem
is reduced to finding the appropriate bilinear game and implementing the required optimization
algorithm. In other words, the method for computing Nash equilibria applies to a zero-sum game
when:
1. One can transfer each strategy x of player A to GA(x) = xˆ ∈ R
n(A), and each strategy y of
player B to GB(y) = yˆ ∈ R
n(B) such that the payoff of the game for strategies xˆ and yˆ can
be represented in a bilinear form based on xˆ and yˆ, i.e., the payoff is xˆtM yˆ where M is a
n(A)× n(B) matrix.
2. For any given vector α and real number α0 we can find, in polynomial time, whether there is
a pure strategy xˆ in the transferred space such that α0 +
∑
i αixˆi ≥ 0.
We refer to such a game as polynomially separable. A direct extension of the proof of Theorem 1
implies that Nash equilibria can be found for polynomially separable games.
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Theorem 2 There is a polytime algorithm which finds a Nash Equilibrium of a given polynomially
separable game.
This general methodology can be used for finding a NE in many zero-sum games. In subsequent
sections, we show how our framework can be used to find Nash equilibria for a generalization of
Blotto games, known as games, and for a class of dueling games introduced by Immorlica et al.
[27].
We also show one can use similar techniques to compute the approximate equilibrium payoffs
of a dueling game when we are not able to answer the separation problem in polynomial time but
instead we can polynomially solve the ǫ-separation problem for any ǫ > 0. The proof of Theorem
2 is deferred to Appendix E.
Theorem 3 Given an oracle function for the ǫ-separation problem, one can find an ǫ-approximation
to the equilibrium payoffs of a polynomially separable game in polynomial time.
2.3 General Lotto
The General Lotto game is a relaxation of the Colonel Lotto game (See [26] for details). In this
game each player’s strategy is a distribution of a nonnegative integer-valued random variable with
a given expectation. In particular, players A and B simultaneously determine (two distributions
of) two nonnegative integer-valued random variables X and Y , respectively, such that E[X] = a
and E[Y ] = b. The payoff of player A is
hAΓ (X,Y ) =
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
Pr(X = i) Pr(Y = j)u(i, j), (4)
and again the payoff of player B is the negative of the payoff of player A, i.e., hBΓ (X,Y ) =
−hAΓ (X,Y ). Hart [26] presents a solution for the General Lotto game when u(i, j) = sign(i − j).
Here, we generalize this result and present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an equilibrium
when u is a bounded distance function. Function u is a bounded distance function, if one can write
it as u(i, j) = fu(i − j) such that fu is a monotone function and reaches its maximum value at
uM = fu(u
T ) where uT ∈ O(poly(a, b)). Note that u(i, j) = sign(i − j) is a bounded distance
function where it reaches its maximum value at i− j = 1. Now, we are ready to present our main
result regarding the General Lotto game.
Theorem 4 There is a polynomial-time algorithm which finds an equilibrium of a General Lotto
game where the payoff function is a bounded distance function.
Main challenge Note that in the General Lotto game, each player has infinite number of pure
strategies, and thus one cannot use neither our proposed algorithm for the Colonel Blotto game nor
the technique of [27] for solving the problem. We should prune strategies such that the problem
becomes tractable. Therefore, we characterize the extreme point of the polytope of all strategies,
and use this characterization for pruning possible strategies.
To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first algorithm of this kind which computes
an NE of a game with infinite number of pure strategies.
3 Application to Dueling Games
Immorlica et al. [27] introduced the class of dueling games. In these games, an optimization
problem with an element of uncertainty is considered as a competition between two players. They
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also provide a technique for finding Nash equilibria for a set of games in this class. Later Dehghani
et al.[17] studied dueling games in a non-computational point of view and proved upper bounds on
the price of anarchy of many dueling games. In this section, we formally define the dueling games
and bilinear duels. Then, in Section 3.3, we describe our method and show that our technique
solves a more general class of dueling games. Furthermore, we provide examples to show how our
method can be a simpler tool for solving bilinear duel games compared to [27] method. Finally,
in Section 3.4, we examine the matching duel game to provide an example where the method of
Immorlica et al. [27] does not work, but our presented method can yet be applied.
3.1 Dueling games
Formally, dueling games are two player zero-sum games with a set of strategies X, a set of possible
situations Ω, a probability distribution p over Ω, and a cost function c : X × Ω → R that defines
the cost measure for each player based on her strategy and the element of uncertainty. The payoff
of each player is defined as the probability that she beats her opponent minus the probability that
she is beaten. More precisely, the utility function is defined as
hA(x, y) = −hB(x, y) = Pr
ω∼p
[c(x, ω) < c(y, ω)]− Pr
ω∼p
[c(x, ω) > c(y, ω)]
where x and y are strategies for player A and B respectively. In the following there are two dueling
games mentioned in [27].
Binary search tree duel. In the Binary search tree duel, there is a set of elements Ω and a
probability distribution p over Ω. Each player is going to construct a binary search tree containing
the elements of Ω. Strategy x beats strategy y for element ω ∈ Ω if and only if the path from ω to
the root in x is shorter than the path from ω to the root in y. Thus, the set of strategies X is the
set of all binary search trees with elements of Ω, and c(x, ω) is defined to be the depth of element
ω in strategy x.
Ranking duel. In the Ranking duel, there is a set of m pages Ω, and a probability distribution
p over Ω, notifying the probability that each page is going to be searched. In the Ranking duel,
two search engines compete against each other. Each search engine has to provide a permutation
of these pages, and a player beats the other if page ω comes earlier in her permutation. Hence, set
of strategies X is all m! permutations of the pages and for permutation x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) and
page ω, c(x, ω) = i iff ω = xi.
3.2 Dueling games are Polynomially Separable
Consider a dueling game in which each strategy xˆ of player A is an n(A) dimensional point in
Euclidean space. Let SA be the convex hull of these strategy points. Thus each point in SA is a
mixed strategy of player A. Similarly define strategy yˆ, n(B), and SB for player B. A dueling game
is bilinear if utility function hA(xˆ, yˆ) has the form xˆtMyˆ whereM is an n(A)×n(B) matrix. Again
for player B, we have hB(xˆ, yˆ) = −hA(xˆ, yˆ). Immorlica et al. [27] provide a method for finding an
equilibrium of a class of bilinear games which is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Polynomially-representable bilinear dueling games: A bilinear dueling game is poly-
nomially representable if one can present the convex hull of strategies SA and SB with m polynomial
linear constraints, i.e. there are m vectors {v1, v2, . . . , vm} and m real numbers {b1, b2, . . . , bm} such
that SA = {xˆ ∈ R
n(A)|∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, vi.xˆ ≥ bi}. Similarly SB = {yˆ ∈ R
n(B)|∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m′}, v′i.yˆ ≥
b′i}.
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In the following theorem, we show that every polynomially representable bilinear duel is also
polynomially separable, as defined in Section 2.2. This implies that the general reduction described
in Section 2.2 can be used to solve polynomially representable bilinear duels as well.
Theorem 5 Every polynomially-representable bilinear duel is polynomially separable.
Proof: Let SA and SB be the set of strategy points for player A and player B, respectively.
We show that if SA can be specified with polynomial number of linear constraints, then one could
design an algorithm that finds out whether there exists a point xˆ ∈ SA such that α0 +
∑
αixˆi ≥ 0.
Let {(v1, b1), (v2, b2), . . . , (vm, bm)} be the set of constraints which specify SA where vi is a vector
of size n(A) and bi is a real number. We need to check if there exists a point satisfying both
constraints in {(v1, b1), (v2, b2), . . . , (vm, bm)} and α0 +
∑
αixˆi ≥ 0. Recall that m is polynomial.
Since all these constraints are linear, we can solve this feasibility problem by a LP in polynomial
time. The same argument holds for SB, therefore every polynomially representable bilinear duel is
polynomially separable as well.
3.3 A Simplified Argument for Ranking and Binary Search Duels
In this section, we revisit some examples of dueling games, and show how to use Theorem 2 to
establish that they can be solved in polynomial time. The application of Theorem 2 as two main
steps. First, it is necessary to express the duel as a bilinear game: that is, one must transfer every
strategy of the players to a point in n(A) and n(B) dimensional space, such the outcome of the
game can be determined for two given strategy points with an n(A)×n(B) matrix M . Second, one
must implement an oracle that determines whether there exists a strategy point satisfying a given
linear constraint.
To illustrate our method more precisely, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an
NE for ranking and binary search tree dueling games in what follows.
Theorem 6 There exists an algorithm that finds an NE of the Ranking duel in polynomial time.
Proof: We transfer each strategy x of player A to point xˆ in Rm
2
where xˆi,j denotes the probability
that ωi stands at position j in x. The outcome of the game is determined by the following equation
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=j+1
xˆi,j yˆi,kp(ωi)−
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
j−1∑
k=1
xˆi,j yˆi,kp(ωi)
Where p(ωi) denotes the probability that ωi is searched.
Here, we need to provide an oracle that determines whether there exists a strategy point for
a player that satisfies a given linear constraint α0 +
∑
αi,jxˆi,j ≥ 0. Since each pure strategy is a
matching between pages and indices, we can find the pure strategy that maximizes
∑
αi,jxˆi,j with
the maximum weighted matching algorithm. Therefore, this query can be answered in polynomial
time. Since we have reduced this game to a polynomially-separable bilinear duel, we can find a
Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
Theorem 7 There exists an algorithm that finds an NE of the Binary search tree duel in polynomial
time.
Proof: Here we map each strategy x to the point xˆ = 〈xˆ1,1, xˆ1,2, . . . , xˆ1,m, xˆ2,1, xˆ2,2, . . . , xˆm,m〉 ∈
R
m2 where xˆi,j denotes the probability that depth of the i-th element is equal to j. Therefore, the
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payoff of the game for strategies xˆ and yˆ is equal to
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=j+1
xˆi,j yˆi,kp(ωi)−
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
j−1∑
k=1
xˆi,j yˆi,kp(ωi)
Where p(ωi) denotes the probability that i-th element is searched.
Next, we need to provide an oracle that determines whether there exists a strategy point for a
player that satisfies a given linear constraint α0 +
∑
αi,jxˆi,j ≥ 0. To do this, we find the binary
search tree that maximizes
∑
αi,j xˆi,j. This can be done with a dynamic program. Let D(a, b, k)
denote the maximum value of
∑b
i=a αi,jxˆi,j for a subtree that its root is at depth k. D(a, b, k) can
be formulated as
D(a, b, k) =
{
a < b, mina≤c≤b{D(a, c − 1, k + 1) +D(c+ 1, b, k + 1) + αc,k}
a = b, αa,k
Therefore, we can find the Binary search tree which maximizes
∑
αi,jxˆi,j in polynomial time and
see if it meets the constraint. Since we have reduced this game to a polynomially-separable bilinear
duel, we can find an NE in polynomial time.
3.4 Matching duel
In matching duel we are given a weighted graph G = (V,E,W ) which is not necessarily bipartite.
In a matching duel each pure strategy of players is a perfect matching, set of possible situations Ω is
the same as the set of nodes in G, and probability distribution p over Ω determines the probability
of selection of each node. In this game, strategy x beats strategy y for element ω ∈ Ω if ω is
matched to a higher weighted edge in strategy x than strategy y.
The matching duel may find its application in a competition between websites that try to match
people according to their desire. In this competition the website that suggest a better match for
each user will get that user, and the goal of each website is to maximize the number of its users.
We mention that the ranking duel is a special case of the matching duel, when G is a complete
bipartite graph with n nodes on each side, in which the first part denotes the web pages and the
second part denotes the positions in the ranking. Thus, the weight of the edge between page i and
rank j is equal to j.
First, we describe how our method can solve this game and then we show the method of
Immorlica et al. [27] cannot be applied to find an NE of the matching duel.
Theorem 8 There exists an algorithm that finds an NE of the matching duel in polynomial time.
Proof: We transfer every strategy x to a point in |E|-dimensional Euclidean space xˆ, where
xˆe denotes the probability that x chooses e in the matching. Thus, the payoff function is bilinear
and is as follows: ∑
ω∈Ω
∑
e1∈N(ω)
∑
e2∈N(ω)
[p(ω)xˆe1 yˆe2 × sign(w(e1)−w(e2))]
where N(ω) is the set of edges adjacent to ω4. Next, we need to prove that the game is polynomially
separable. That is, given a vector α and a real number α0, we are to find out whether there is a
strategy xˆ such that α0 + α.xˆ ≥ 0. This problem can be solved by a maximum weighted prefect
4Note that sign(w) is 1, −1, and 0 if w is positive, negative, and zero respectively.
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matching, where the graph is G = (V,E,W ) and w(e) = αe. Thus our framework can be used to
find an NE of the matching duel in polynomial time.
Note that Rothvoss [43] showed that the feasible strategy polytope (the perfect matching poly-
tope) has exponentially many facets. Therefore, the prior approach represented in the work of
Immorlica et al. [27] is not applicable to the matching duel. This example shows that our frame-
work nontrivially generalizes the method of Immorlica et al. [27] and completes the presentation
of our simpler and more powerful tool for solving bilinear duels.
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A Colonel Blotto
In this appendix we provide a more detailed desciption of our polynomial time algorithm for finding
a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the Colonel Blotto game. Hart showed that the Colonel Lotto game
is equivalent to a special case of the Colonel Blotto game [26]. Therefore, our algorithm could be
used to find a NE of the Colonel Lotto game as well.
In section A.1, we present a procedure for mapping strategies of both players to a new space.
The new space maintains the important information of each strategy and helps us to find a Nash
equilibrium of the game. Next in section A.2, we show how we check the feasibility of the member-
ship constraint in the new space. Moreover, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for determining
an equilibrium of the Colonel Blotto game in the new space. At last in section A.3, we present an
algorithm which transfers a Nash equilibrium from the new space to the original space.
A.1 Transferring to a new space
In this subsection we define a new notation for describing the strategies of players and discuss about
the properties of the transferred strategies. Let n(A) = k(a + 1), and x be a strategy of player
A. We define the function GA in the following way: GA(x) = xˆ where xˆ is a point in R
n(A) such
that xˆ(i−1)(a+1)+j+1 is equal to the probability that strategy x puts j units in the i-th battlefield,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 0 ≤ j ≤ a. For simplicity we may represent xˆ(i−1)(a+1)+j+1 by xˆi,j. We define
n(B) and GB similarly for player B. Let n = max{n(A), n(B)}. Note that, GA maps each strategy
of the first player to exactly one point in Rn(A). However, each point in Rn(A) may be mapped to
zero, one, or more than one strategies. Let us recall the definition of M(X ) which is the set of all
strategies of player A, and the definition of SA which is
SA = {xˆ ∈ [0, 1]
n(A)|∃x ∈ M(X ),GA(x) = xˆ}.
In order to design an algorithm for checking the membership constraint, we first demonstrate in
Lemma A.1 that set SA is a polyhedron with an exponential number of vertices and facets. This
lemma is a more formal statement of Lemma 1. Then we prove in Lemma A.2 that set SA can be
formulated with O(2poly(n)) number of constraints. These results allow us to leverage the Ellipsoid
method for checking the membership constraint [25].
Lemma A.1 Set SA forms a convex polyhedron with no more than n(A)
n(A) vertices and no more
than n(A)(n(A)
2) facets.
See Appendix D for the proof of Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.2 Set SA can be formulated with O(2
poly(n)) number of constraints
See Appendix D for the proof of Lemma A.2.
A.2 Checking the membership constraint and the payoff constraints
As we briefly described in Subsection 2, the final goal of this section is to determine a NE of the
Colonel Blotto game. To do this, we provide linear program 2 and show that this LP can be solved
in polynomial time. Since we use the Ellipsoid method to solve the LP, we have to implement an
oracle function that reports a violating constraint for any infeasible solution. In this subsection we
focus on the membership constraint of LP 2 and show that for any infeasible point xˆ which violates
membership constraint, a polynomial-time algorithm finds a hyperplane that separates xˆ from SA.
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Lemma A.3 There exists a polynomial time algorithm that gets a point xˆ as input, and either
finds a hyperplane that separates xˆ from SA, or reports that no such hyperplane exists.
Proof: Let xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn(A)). Consider the following LP, which we will refer to as LP 5:
α0 +
n(A)∑
j=1
αj xˆj < 0 (5)
α0 +
n(A)∑
j=1
αj vˆj ≥ 0 ∀vˆ ∈ IA (6)
The variables of the linear program are α0, α1, . . . , αn(A), which describe the following hyperplane:
α0 +
n(A)∑
j=1
αjxˆ
′
j = 0.
Constraints 5 and 6 force LP 5 to find a hyperplane that separates xˆ from SA. Hence, LP 5 finds
a separating hyperplane if and only if xˆ is not in SA.
Hyperplane separating oracle is an oracle that gets variables α0, α1, . . . , αn(A) as input and finds
if constraints 6 are satisfied. Moreover, if some constraints are violated it returns at least one of
the violated constraints. In Section C we describe a polynomial-time algorithm for the hyperplane
separating oracle. Constraint 5 also can be checked in polynomial time. Our LP has n(A) + 1
variables and |IA| + 1 constraints which is O(2
poly(n)) by Lemma A.1. Thus we can solve this LP
in polynomial time with the Ellipsoid method [25].
In the next step, we present an algorithm to determine the outcome of the game when both
players play optimally. We say x is an optimal strategy of player A, if it maximizes the guaranteed
payoff of player A. By the MinMax Theorem, in a NE of a zero-sum game players play optimally
[46]. Therefore, it is enough to find an optimal strategy of both players. Before we discuss the
algorithm, we show the payoff hAB (x,y) can be determined by GA(x) and GB(y). Recall the definition
of hAB (xˆ, yˆ) which is
hAB (xˆ, yˆ) =
k∑
i=1
a∑
α=0
b∑
β=0
xˆi,αyˆi,βu
A
i (α, β).
Lemma A.4 Let x ∈ M(X ) and y ∈ M(Y) be two mixed strategies for player A and B respec-
tively. Let xˆ = GA(x) and yˆ = GB(y). The outcome of the game is determined by h
A
B (xˆ, yˆ).
Proof: Let x and y be two mixed strategies of players A and B respectively, and let E[uAi (x,y)]
be the expected value of the outcome in battlefield i. We can write E[uAi (x,y)] as follows
E[uAi (x,y)] =
a∑
α=0
b∑
β=0
xˆi,αyˆi,βu
A
i (α, β).
We know that the total outcome of the game is the sum of the outcome in all battlefields, which is
E
[
k∑
i=1
uAi (x,y)
]
=
k∑
i=1
E[uAi (x,y)] =
k∑
i=1
a∑
α=0
b∑
β=0
xˆi,αyˆi,βu
A
i (α, β) = h
A
B (xˆ, yˆ).
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Theorem A.1 There exists a polynomial time algorithm that finds a NE of the Colonel Blotto
game in the new space.
Proof: The Colonel Blotto is a zero-sum game, and the MinMax theorem states that a pair of
strategies (xˆ, yˆ) is a Nash equilibrium if xˆ and yˆ maximize the guaranteed payoff of players A and
B respectively [46].
Recall that LP 2 finds a point xˆ ∈ SA which describes an optimal strategy of player A
5. This
LP has n(A) + 1 variables xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn(A) and U where xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn(A) describe point xˆ. The
membership constraint guarantees xˆ is in SA. It is known that in any normal-form game there
always exists a best-response strategy which is a pure strategy [40]. Hence, variable U represents
the maximum payoff of player A with strategy xˆ when player B plays his best-response strategy
against xˆ. Note that, Lemma A.4 shows hAB (xˆ, yˆ) is a linear function of xˆ, when yˆ is a fixed strategy
of player B. This means the payoff constraints are linear constraints. Putting all these together
show, LP 2 finds a point xˆ such that:
1. There exists strategy x such that GA(x) = xˆ.
2. The minimum value of hAB (x,y) is maximized for every y ∈ M(Y).
Next we show that this LP can be solved in polynomial time with the Ellipsoid method. First,
Lemma A.3 proposes a polynomial-time algorithm for checking the membership constraint. Second,
best-response separating oracle is an oracle that gets point xˆ and variable U as input and either
reports point xˆ passes all payoff constrains or reports a violated payoff constraint. In Section C,
we will show that the running time of this oracle is O(poly(n)).
At last we prove LP 2 has O(2poly(n)) number of constraints, and we can leverage the Ellipsoid
method for finding a solution of this LP. Note that Lemma A.2 indicates that set SA can be
represented by O(2poly(n)) number of hyperplanes. On the other hand, Lemma A.1 shows LP 2 has
at most |IB | = O(2
poly(n)) constraints.
A.3 Finding a Nash equilibrium in the original space
In the previous subsection, we presented an algorithm which finds a Nash equilibrium (GA(x),GB(y))
of the game in the new space. The remaining problem is to retrieve x from GA(x).
Theorem A.2 Given a point xˆ ∈ SA, there exists a polynomial time algorithm which finds a
strategy x ∈ M(X ) such that GA(x) = xˆ.
Proof: Since every strategy of player A is a convex combination of elements of X , our goal is to
find a feasible solution of the following LP.
min . 0 (7)
s.t.
∑
x∈X
αx = 1 (8)
∑
x∈X
αxGA(x)j = xˆj ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n(A) (9)
αx ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X (10)
5The same procedure finds an optimal strategy of player B.
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where αx is the probability of pure strategy x ∈ X . Note that, this LP finds a mixed strategy of
player A by finding the probability of each pure strategy. Since every feasible solution is acceptable,
objective function does not matter. To find a solution of this LP, we write its dual LP as follows.
max . β0 +
n(A)∑
j=1
xˆjβj (11)
s.t. β0 +
n(A)∑
j=1
GA(x)jβj ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ X (12)
Where variable β0 stands for constraint 8, and variables β1, β2, . . . , βn(A) stand for constraints 9.
An oracle similar to the hyperplane separating oracle can find a violating constraint for any infea-
sible solution of the dual LP. Since the number of constraints in the dual LP is |IA| = O(2
poly(n))
based on Lemma A.1, we can use the Ellipsoid method and find an optimal solution of the dual LP
in polynomial time.
The next challenge is to find an optimal solution of the primal LP from an optimal solution of
the dual LP. We resolve this problem by the following lemma. We know xˆ is in SA. This means
there is strategy x ∈ M(X ) such that GA(x) = xˆ. Hence, linear program 7 and its dual are feasible,
and we can apply Lemma A.5.
Lemma A.5 Assume we have a separation oracle for primal LP max{cTx : Ax ≤ b} with expo-
nentially many constraints and polynomially many variables. If primal LP is feasible, then there is
a polynomial-time algorithm which returns an optimum solution of dual LP min{bT y : AT y ≥ c}.
Proof: Since the primal LP is feasible, we can assume OPT = max{cTx : Ax ≤ b}. The
Ellipsoid method returns an optimum solution of primal LP by doing binary search and finding
the largest K which guarantees feasibility of {cTx ≤ K : Ax ≤ b}. Let (Aˆ, bˆ) be the set of
polynomially many constraints returned by the separation oracle during all iterations. We first
prove max{cTx : Aˆx ≤ bˆ} = OPT . Note that (Aˆ, bˆ) is a set of constraints returned by the
Ellipsoid method. Note that (Aˆ, bˆ) is a subset of all constraints (A, b). This means every vector
x which satisfies Ax ≤ b will satisfy Aˆx ≤ bˆ as well. Therefore, max{cTx : Aˆx ≤ bˆ} ≥ max{cTx :
Ax ≤ b} = OPT . On the other hand, we know (Aˆ, bˆ) contains constraints which guarantees
infeasibility of max{cTx ≥ OPT + ǫ : Ax ≤ b}. So, LP max{cTx ≥ OPI + ǫ : Aˆx ≤ bˆ} is
infeasible which means max{cTx : Aˆx ≤ bˆ} ≤ OPT . Putting all these together we can conclude
that max{cTx : Aˆx ≤ bˆ} = OPT .
Linear program max{cTx : Aˆx ≤ bˆ} has polynomially many constraints and polynomially many
variables, and we can find an optimum solution to its dual min{bˆT yˆ : AˆT yˆ ≥ c} in polynomial time.
Let yˆ∗ be an optimum solution of dual LP min{bˆT yˆ : AˆT yˆ ≥ c}, and let S = {i|(Ai, bi) is in (Aˆ, bˆ)}
where Ai is the i-th row of matrix A, i.e., be set of indices corresponding to constraints in (Aˆ, bˆ).
For every vector y and every set of indices R we define yR to be the projection of vector y on set R.
Now consider vector y∗ as a solution of dual LP min{bT y : AT y ≥ c} such that y∗S = yˆ
∗ and y∗i = 0
for all i 6∈ S. We prove y∗ is an optimum solution of dual LP min{bT y : AT y ≥ c} as follows:
• We first show y∗ is feasible. Note that y∗i = 0 for all i 6∈ S which means A
T y∗ = AˆT yˆ∗ ≥ c
where the last inequality comes from the feasibility of yˆ∗ in dual LP min{bˆT y : AˆT y ≥ c}.
• Note that bT y∗ =
∑
i b
T
i y
∗
i =
∑
i∈S b
T
i y
∗
i+
∑
i 6∈S b
T
i y
∗
i = bˆ
T yˆ∗. The last equality comes from the
facts that y∗i = 0 for all i 6∈ S, and
∑
i∈S b
T
i y
∗
i = bˆ
T yˆ∗. Since yˆ∗ is an optimum solution of dual
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the LP min{bˆT y : AˆT y ≥ c}, by the weak duality, it is equal to max{cTx : Aˆx ≤ bˆ} = OPT .
Therefore, bT y∗ = OPT .
We have proved y∗ is a feasible solution to dual LP min{bT y : AT y ≥ c} and bT y∗ = OPT . We
also know OPT = max{cTx : Ax ≤ b} by definition. Therefore, the weak duality insures y∗ is an
optimum solution of dual LP min{bT y : AT y ≥ c}.
B General Lotto
In this section we study the General Lotto game. An instance of the General Lotto game is defined
by Γ(a, b, u), where players A and B simultaneously define probability distributions of non-negative
integers X and Y , respectively, such that E[X] = a and E[Y ] = b. In this game, player A’s aim is to
maximize hAΓ (X,Y ) and player B’s aim is to maximize h
B
Γ (X,Y ) = −h
A
Γ (X,Y ) where h
A
Γ (X,Y ) is
defined as Ei∼X,j∼Y u(i, j). The previous studies of the General Lotto game considered a special case
of the problem where u(i, j) = sign(i − j)6. Here, we generalize the payoff function to a bounded
distance function and present an algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium of the General Lotto game
in this case. Function u is a bounded distance function, if one can write it as u(i, j) = fu(i−j) such
that fu is a monotone function and reaches its maximum value at fu(tu) where tu ∈ O(poly(a, b)).
We first define a new version of the General Lotto game, which is called the finite General Lotto
game. We prove a Nash equilibrium of the finite General Lotto game can be found in polynomial
time. Then we reduce the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of the General Lotto game with a
bounded distance function to the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of the finite General Lotto
game. This helps us to propose a polynomial-time algorithm which finds a Nash equilibrium of the
General Lotto game where the payoff function is a bounded distance function.
B.1 Finite General Lotto
We define the finite General Lotto game Γ(a, b, u, S) to be an instance of the General Lotto game
where every strategy of players is a distribution over a finite set of numbers S. Here, we leverage
our general technique to show the finite General Lotto game is a polynomially-separable bilinear
game and, as a consequence, it leads to a polynomial time algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium for
this game.
Theorem B.1 There exists an algorithm which finds a Nash equilibrium of the finite General Lotto
game Γ(a, b, u, S) in time O(poly(|S|)).
Proof: First we map each strategy X to a point xˆ = 〈xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆ|S|〉, where xˆi denotes Pr(X =
Si). Without loss of generality we assume the elements of S are sorted in strictly ascending order,
i.e. for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |S|, Si < Sj. Now the utility of player A when A plays a strategy
corresponding to xˆ and B plays a strategy corresponding to yˆ is obtained by the following linear
function.
hAΓ (xˆ, yˆ) =
|S|∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
xˆyˆu(i, j) −
|S|∑
i=1
|S|∑
j=i+1
xˆyˆu(i, j).
6 sign(x) =


−1 x < 0
0 x = 0
1 x > 0
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Therefore the game is bilinear. Now we prove the game is polynomially separable.
Given a real number r and a vector v, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm which determines
whether there exists a strategy point xˆ such that r + v.xˆ ≥ 0. We design the following feasibility
program for this problem with |S| variables xˆ1 to xˆ|S| and three constraints.
|S|∑
i=1
xˆi = 1 (13)
|S|∑
i=1
xˆiSi = a (14)
r + v.xˆ ≥ 0 (15)
Constraints 13 and 14 force the variables to represent a valid strategy point (i.e., the probabilities
sum to 1 and the expectation equals a). Thus every point xˆ is a valid strategy point iff it satisfies
Constraints 13 and 14. On the other hand, Constraint 15 enforces the program to satisfy the
given linear constraint of the separation problem. Thus there exists a strategy point xˆ such that
b + v.xˆ ≥ 0 iff there is a solution for the feasibility LP. The feasibility of the program can be
determined in polynomial time, hence, the separation problem is polynomially tractable.
Therefore the finite General Lotto game is a polynomially-separable bilinear game and by Theo-
rem 2, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which finds a Nash equilibrium of the finite General
Lotto game.
B.2 General Lotto with bounded distance functions
In this section, we consider General Lotto game Γ(a, b, u) where u is a bounded distance function
and design a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the following
part of this section we assume a ≤ b. Recall the definition of bounded distance functions.
Definition B.1 Function u is a bounded distance function, if one can write it as u(i, j) = fu(i−j)
such that fu is a monotone function and reaches its maximum value at u
M = fu(u
T ) where uT ∈
O(poly(a, b)). We call uT the threshold of function u, and uM the maximum of function u 7 .
First we define a notion of paired strategies and claim that for every strategy of a player there
is a best-response strategy which is a paired strategy. Then, using this observation, we can prove
nice bounds on the set of optimal strategies.
Consider a probability distribution which only allows two possible outcomes, i.e., there are
only two elements in S with non-zero probabilities. We call such a distribution a paired strategy.
We define Ti,j to be a paired strategy which only has non-zero probabilities at elements i and j.
Furthermore, we define T ai,j to be a paired strategy with E[T
a
i,j] = a. In paired strategy T
a
i,j, the
probabilities of elements i and j are determined by αai,j = Pr(T
a
i,j = i) =
a−j
i−j and α
a
j,i = Pr(T
a
i,j =
j) = a−i
j−i = 1 − α
a
i,j. In the following structural lemma, we show that every distribution T over a
finite set S can be constructed by a set of paired strategies.
Lemma B.1 For every distribution T over S with E[T ] = a and t elements with non-zero prob-
ability, there are m ≤ t paired strategies σ1, σ2, . . . , σm such that T =
∑m
r=1 βrσr
8, and for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m we have βi ∈ [0, 1] and E[σi] = a.
7Note that sign function is a special case of distance functions.
8This lemma claims that the strategy of a player in the finite General Lotto game can be written as a probability
distribution over paired strategies. Thus T = β1σ1 + β2σ2 + . . . + βmσm describes a strategy in which the paired
strategy σi is played with probability βi.
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Proof: We prove this claim by induction on the number of elements with non-zero probabilities
in T . If there is only one element with non-zero probability in T , i.e., t = 1, then we have
Pr(T = a) = 1. Thus T = T a0,a is a paired strategy and the claim holds by setting σ1 = T
a
0,a and
β1 = 1. Now assuming the claim holds for all 1 ≤ t
′ < t, we prove the claim also holds for t.
Suppose T be a probability distribution with t non-zero probability elements. Since t ≥ 2, there
should be some i < a with Pr(T = i) > 0 and some j > a with Pr(T = j) > 0. We choose the
largest possible number 0 < β ≤ 1 such that βαai,j ≤ Pr(T = i) and βα
a
j,i ≤ Pr(T = j). If β = 1,
then Pr(T = i) + Pr(T = j) ≥ αai,j + α
a
j,i = 1. This means T = T
a
i,j is a paired strategy and the
claim holds by setting σ1 = T
a
i,j and β1 = 1. Otherwise, we can write T = (1− β)T
′ + βT ai,j where
T ′ =
T−βTai,j
1−β . Furthermore we have
E[T ′] =
E[T − βT ai,j]
1− β
=
E[T ]− βE[T ai,j ]
1− β
= a.
We select β such that at least one of the probabilities Pr[T ′ = i] or Pr[T ′ = j] becomes zero. Thus
compared to T , the number of elements with non-zero probability in T ′ is at least decreased by one,
and by the induction hypothesis we can write T ′ = β′1σ
′
1 + β
′
2σ
′
2 + . . . + β
′
m′σ
′
m′ where m
′ ≤ t− 1.
Let βi = (1− β)β
′
i and σi = σ
′
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
′ and βm′+1 = β and σm′+1 = T
a
i,j. Now we can write
T = β1σ1+β2σ2+ . . .+βm′+1σm′+1 where each σi is a paired strategy and E(σi) = a. Furthermore,
m = m′ + 1 ≤ t and the proof is complete. Since t ≤ |S|, m is polynomial in the size of input.
Therefore paired strategies σ1, σ2, . . . , σm and their corresponding coefficients β1, β2, . . . , βm can be
computed in polynomial time.
Lemma B.2 For every strategy of player A in a finite General Lotto game there is a best-response
strategy of player B which is a paired strategy.
Proof: Consider finite General Lotto game Γ(a, b, u, S), strategy X of player A, and a best-
response strategy Z of player B. Since Z is a distribution on S, by using Lemma B.1 we can write
Z =
∑m
r=1 βrσr. Thus, we have h
B
Γ (X,Z) = h
B
Γ (X,
∑m
r=1 βrσr) and because of the linearity of
expectation we can write hBΓ (X,Z) =
∑m
r=1 βrh
B
Γ (X,σr). Since Z is a best-response strategy, we
have:
∀1 ≤ r ≤ m, hBΓ (X,σr) = h
B
Γ (X,Z). (16)
This means paired strategy σr, for each 1 ≤ r ≤ m, is a best-response strategy of player B.
In the following lemmas, using the structural property of the best-response strategies, we show
some bounds for each player’s optimal strategies.
Lemma B.3 For any strategy X with E[X] = c and any integer j we have
∑j
i=0 Pr(X = i) ≥
1− c
j+1 .
Proof: Since
∑+∞
i=0 iPr(X = i) = c, we have (j + 1)
∑+∞
i=j+1 Pr(X = i) ≤ c. This implies
j∑
i=0
Pr(X = i) = 1−
+∞∑
i=j+1
Pr(X = i) ≥ 1−
c
j + 1
.
Lemma B.4 Consider Nash equilibrium (X,Y ) of General Lotto game Γ(a, b, u) where u is a
bounded distance function with threshold uT . We have
∑a−1
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≤
uT
uT+1
.
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Proof: Let X ′ be a pair distribution of player A that chooses a−1 with probability p and chooses
a+ uT − 1 with probability 1− p. Thus p = u
T−1
uT
. The payoff of playing strategy X ′ against Y is
hAΓ (X
′, Y ) =
+∞∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)[pu(a− 1, i) + (1− p)u(a+ uT − 1, i)]. (17)
Note that by the definition of u, u(i, j) ≥ 0 if and only if i − j ≥ 0 and u(i, j) ≤ 0 if and only
if i− j ≤ 0. Furthermore, if i− j ≥ uT then u(i, j) = uM and if i− j ≤ −uT then u(i, j) = −uM .
Therefore,
a−1∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)pu(a− 1, i) ≥ 0
a−1∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)(1− p)u(a+ uT − 1, i) ≥ (1− p)uM
a−1∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)
+∞∑
i=a
Pr(Y = i)[pu(a− 1, i) + (1− p)u(a+ uT − 1, i)] ≥ − uM
+∞∑
i=a
Pr(Y = i)
(18)
Note that a ≤ b and (X,Y ) is a Nash equilibrium which means hAΓ (X,Y ) ≤ 0. This implies
hAΓ (X
′, Y ) ≤ 0. Thus, by applying Equality 17 and Inequality 18 we have
0 ≥ hAΓ (X
′, Y ) ≥ (1− p)uM
a−1∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)− uM
+∞∑
i=a
Pr(Y = i),
which implies
∑+∞
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≥ (2 − p)
∑a−1
i=0 Pr(Y = i). Thus,
∑a−1
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≤
1
2−p . By
substituting u
T−1
uT
instead of p we can conclude
∑a−1
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≤
uT
uT+1
.
In the following lemma we provide an upper-bound for the maximum variable with non-zero
probability of a player’s strategy in the equilibrium.
Lemma B.5 Consider a Nash equilibrium (X,Y ) of General Lotto game Γ(a, b, u) where u is a
bounded distance function with threshold uT . If uˆ = (4buT + 4b + uT )(2uT + 2), then we have
Pr(Y > uˆ+ uT ) = 0 and Pr(X > uˆ) = 0.
Proof: First, we prove for any integer z > uˆ, Pr(X = z) = 0. The proof is by contradiction. Let
z > uˆ be an integer with non-zero probability in X. Thus there is an integer x < a with non-zero
probability in X. Consider the pair distribution T ax,z. We define another pair distribution T
a
x,y
where y = 4buT + 4b+ uT .
Consider strategy Xǫ = X − ǫT ax,z + ǫT
a
x,y. Note that (X,Y ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
This means strategy X is a best response of player A to strategy Y of player B which implies
hAΓ (X,Y ) ≥ h
A
Γ (X
ǫ, Y ). On the other hand, because of the linearity of expectation we can write
hAΓ (X
ǫ, Y ) = hAΓ (X,Y )− ǫh
A
Γ (T
a
x,z, Y ) + ǫh
A
Γ (T
a
x,y, Y ).
Therefore, we conclude w = hAΓ (T
a
x,z, Y )− h
A
Γ (T
a
x,y, Y ) ≥ 0. Let p = α
a
z,x and q = α
a
y,x. We have
w =
+∞∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)[(1 − p)u(x, i) + pu(z, i)] −
+∞∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)[(1 − q)u(x, i) + qu(y, i)] ≥ 0.
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We write w as w = w1 + w2 − w3 − w4 + w5, where
w1 =
x∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)[[(1 − p)u(x, i) + pu(z, i)] − [(1− q)u(x, i) + qu(y, i)]],
w2 =
+∞∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i)[(1 − p)u(x, i) − (1− q)u(x, i)],
w3 =
y−uT−1∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i)qu(y, i),
w4 =
+∞∑
i=y−uT
Pr(Y = i)qu(y, i),
w5 =
+∞∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i)pu(z, i).
Since 1 − p ≥ 1 − q and u(z, i) = u(y, i) = uM for all i ≤ x, we can conclude w1 ≤ 0. For all
i > x, we have u(x, i) ≤ 0, and we also know 1 − p ≥ 1 − q. These mean w2 ≤ 0. Since for all
i ≤ y − uT we have u(y, i) = uM , we conclude
w3 = qu
M
y−uT−1∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i) (19)
Moreover, for any arbitrary integers i and j, we have −uM ≤ u(i, j) ≤ uM . Thus
−w4 ≤ qu
M
+∞∑
i=y−uT
Pr(Y = i) (20)
w5 ≤ pu
M
+∞∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i) (21)
Therefore by knowing w ≥ 0, w1 ≤ 0, w2 ≤ 0, and considering Inequalities 19, 20, and 21, we
conclude
uM (−q
y−uT−1∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i) + q
+∞∑
i=y−uT
Pr(Y = i) + p
+∞∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i)) ≥ w ≥ 0. (22)
y − uT − 1 = 4buT + 4b− 1 and by Lemma B.3,
∑y−uT−1
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≥ 1−
b
4buT+4b
= 4u
T+3
4uT+4
. Note
that x < a which means
∑x
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≤
∑a−1
i=0 Pr(Y = i). On the other hand, Lemma B.4 says∑a−1
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≤
uT
uT+1
. Hence we can conclude
∑x
i=0 Pr(Y = i) ≤
uT
uT+1
. Therefore
y−uT−1∑
i=x+1
Pr(Y = i) =
y−uT−1∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i)−
x∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i) ≥
3
4uT + 4
(23)
and
+∞∑
i=y−uT
Pr(Y = i) = 1−
y−uT−1∑
i=0
Pr(Y = i) ≤
1
4uT + 4
. (24)
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By Inequalities 22, 23, 24, and
∑+∞
i=x+1 Pr(Y = i) ≤ 1, we have
−q
3
4uT + 4
+ q
1
4uT + 4
+ p ≥ 0. (25)
which implies q
p
≤ 2uT + 2. Recalling p = αaz,x =
a−x
z−x , q = α
a
y,x =
a−x
y−x , and z > y, we can bound
z
y
as follows z
y
≤ z−x
y−x =
q
p
≤ 2uT + 2. Therefore z ≤ y(2uT + 2) = uˆ which is a contradiction.
Knowing that player A put zero probability on every number z > uˆ and considering the definition
of bounded distance function u, player B will put zero probability of every number greater than
uˆ+ uT in any Nash equilibrium.
The following theorem follows immediately after Theorem B.1 and Lemma B.5.
Theorem B.2 There is a polynomial time algorithm which finds a Nash Equilibrium of the General
Lotto game Γ(a, b, u) where u is a bounded distance function.
Proof: Let u¯ = (4buT + 4b + uT )(2uT + 2) + uT . Lemma B.5 shows there is a bound on the
optimal strategies in a Nash equilibrium. More precisely Pr(Y > u¯) = 0, where Y is a strategy
of player A or B. Thus General Lotto game Γ(a, b, u) is equivalent to finite General Lotto game
Γ(a, b, f, S), where S = {1, 2, . . . , u¯}. By Theorem B.1, a polynomial-time algorithm finds a Nash
equilibrium of the game.
C Oracles
In this section we describe, in precise detail, the separating oracles used by the ellipsoid method
to solve our represented linear programs. Consider we are given a sequence c0, c1, . . . , ck(m+1),
where k is the number of battlefields and m is the number of troops for a player. We first present
an algorithm which finds a pure strategy x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) ∈ X such that
∑k
i=1 xi = m, and
xˆ = G(x) minimizes the following equation.
c0 +
k(m+1)∑
i=1
cixˆi (26)
Then we leverage this algorithm and design polynomial-time algorithms for the hyperplane sepa-
rating oracle and best-response separating oracle. The following lemma shows that Algorithm 1
(FindBestPure ) finds the minimizer of Equation 26.
Lemma C.1 Given two integersm and k and a sequence c0, c1, . . . , ck(m+1), algorithm FindBestPure
correctly finds an optimal pure strategy x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) where
∑k
i=1 xi = m, xˆ = G(x) and xˆ
minimizes c0 +
∑k(m+1)
i=1 cixˆi.
Proof: In Algorithm FindBestPure , using a dynamic programming approach, we define d[i, t]
to be the minimum possible value of c0+
∑i(t+1)
i′=1 ci′ xˆi′ where
∑i
i′=1 xi′ = t. Hence, d[k,m] denotes
the minimum possible value of c0 +
∑k(m+1)
i=1 cixˆi. Now, we show that Algorithm FindBestPure
correctly computes d[i, t] for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k and 0 ≤ t ≤ m. Obviously d[0, j] is equal to c0. For an
arbitrary i > 0 and t, the optimal strategy x puts 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t units in the i-th battlefield and the
applied cost in the equation 26 is equal to c(i−1)(m+1)+t′+1. Thus,
d[i, t] = min
0≤t′≤t
{d[i − 1, t− t′] + c(i−1)(m+1)+t′+1}
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Algorithm 1 FindBestPure
input: m, k, c0, c1, c2, . . . , ck(m+1)
1: for j ← 1 to m do
2: d[0, j]← c0
3: end for
4: for i← 1 to k do
5: for t← 0 to m do
6: for j ← 0 to t do
7: if d[i− 1, t− j] + c(i−1)(m+1)+j+1 < d[i, t] then
8: d[i, t]← d[i− 1, t− j] + c(i−1)(m+1)+j+1
9: r[i, t]← j
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: rem← m
15: for i← k downto 1 do
16: xi ← r[i, rem]
17: rem← rem− r[i, rem]
18: end for
19: return x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk)
To compute the optimal pure strategy x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) we also keep a value
r[i, t] = argmin
0≤t′≤t
{d[i − 1, t− t′] + c(i−1)(m+1)+t′+1}
which determines the number of units the optimal strategy should put in the i-th battlefield to
minimize c0 +
∑i(t+1)
i′=1 ci′ xˆi′ . Assuming we have correctly computed xi+1, . . . , xk, in line 16, al-
gorithm FindBestPure correctly computes xi which is equal to r[i,m −
∑k
j=i+1 xj ]. Since
xk = r[k,m] we can conclude algorithm FindBestPure correctly computes the optimal strategy
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk).
C.1 Hyperplane separating oracle
Algorithm 2 (HyperplaneOracle ) gets a hyperplane as input and either finds a point in IA
which violates constraints in LP 5 or reports that all points in IA are satisfying all constraints in
LP 5. We suppose that the input hyperplane is described by the following equation,
α0 + α1xˆ1 + . . .+ αk(a+1)xˆk(a+1) = 0 (27)
and we want to find a point xˆ ∈ IA that violates the following constraint:
α0 +
n∑
i=1
αixˆi ≥ 0 (28)
This problem is equivalent to finding a point xˆmin ∈ IA which minimizes equation α0 +∑n
i=1 αixˆi. If α0 +
∑n
i=1 αixˆ
min
i ≥ 0 it means all points in IA are satisfying the constraints of
LP, and otherwise xˆmin is a point which violates constraint 6. Since points in IA are equivalent
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to pure strategies of player A, we can use algorithm FindBestPure to find xˆmin. Thus we can
conclude algorithm HyperplaneOracle correctly finds a violated constraint or reports that the
hyperplane satisfies constraints 6 of LP 5.
Algorithm 2 HyperplaneOracle
input: a, k, α0, α1, . . . , αk(a+1)
1: xmin ← FindBestPure(a, k, α0, α1, . . . , αk(a+1))
2: xˆmin ← GA(x
min)
3: if α0 +
∑k(a+1)
i=1 αixˆ
min
i ≥ 0 then
4: return pass
5: else
6: return α0 +
∑k(a+1)
i=1 αixˆ
min
i < 0
7: end if
C.2 Best-response separating oracle
Algorithm 3 (BestRespOracle ) gets a pair (xˆ, U) as input and decides whether there is a pure
strategy y = (y1, y2, . . . , yk) ∈ Y such that for yˆ = GB(y), we have
k∑
i=1
a∑
ta=0
b∑
tb=0
xˆi,ta yˆi,tbu
A
i (ta, tb) < U. (29)
We can rewrite inequality 29 as follows:
k∑
i=1
b∑
tb=0
yˆi,tb
a∑
ta=0
xˆi,tau
A
i (ta, tb) < U
Therefore, by letting ci,tb =
∑a
ta=0
xˆi,tau
A
i (ta, tb), this problem is equivalent to find a point
yˆmin ∈ IB which minimizes
∑k(b+1)
i′=1 ci′ yˆi′ . If
∑k(b+1)
i′=1 ci′ yˆ
min
i′ < U we have found a violating payoff
constraint of LP 2 and if
∑k(b+1)
i′=1 ci′ yˆ
min
i′ ≥ U , pair (xˆ, U) satisfies all the payoff constraints of LP
2. Thus, by Lemma C.1 we conclude that algorithm BestRespOracle correctly finds a violating
payoff constraint of LP 2 or reports that (xˆ, U) satisfies all the payoff constrains.
D Proofs Ommitted from Appendix A
Proof of Lemma A.1: We need Lemmas D.1 and D.2 for proving Lemma A.1.
Lemma D.1 Let x1,x2, . . . ,xt be t arbitrary mixed strategies of player A,
∑t
r=1 αr = 1, and
x =
∑t
r=1 αrx
r be a mixed strategy that plays strategy xr with probability αr, then GA(x) =∑t
r=1 αrGA(x
r).
Proof: Since x =
∑t
r=1 αrx
r and GA(x
r)j represent the probability that strategy x
r plays j, we
have [GA(x)]j =
∑t
r=1 αr[GA(x
r)]j , for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n(A). Therefore, GA(x) =
∑t
r=1 αrGA(x
r).
Lemma D.2 SA is a convex set.
25
Algorithm 3 BestRespOracle
input: a, b, k, U , xˆ1, . . . , xˆk(a+1)
1: for i← 1 to k do
2: for tb ← 0 to b do
3: c(i−1)(b+1)+tb+1 = ci,tb =
∑a
ta=0
xˆi,ta u
A
i (ta, tb)
4: end for
5: end for
6: ymin ← FindBestPure(b, k, c0, c1, c2, . . . , ck(b+1))
7: yˆmin ← GB(y
min)
8: if
∑k(b+1)
i=1 ciyˆ
min
i ≥ U then
9: return pass
10: else
11: return
∑k(b+1)
i=1 ciyˆ
min
i < U
12: end if
Proof: A set of points is convex if and only if every segment joining two of its points is completely
in the set. Let xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn(A)) and xˆ
′ = (xˆ′1, xˆ
′
2, . . . , xˆ
′
n(A)) be two points in R
n(A). We show
that if xˆ, xˆ′ ∈ SA then for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, xˆ
′′ = (αxˆ+ (1− α)xˆ′) ∈ SA.
Since xˆ and xˆ′ are in SA, there exist mixed strategies x and x
′ in M(X ), such that xˆ = GA(x) and
xˆ′ = GA(x
′). Let x′′ = αx+(1−α)x′ be a mixed strategy of player A that plays x with probability
α and x′ with probability 1 − α. By Lemma D.1 we have GA(x
′′) = αxˆ + (1 − α)xˆ′ = xˆ′′ hence,
xˆ′′ ∈ SA.
Now we are ready to proof Lemma A.1. By Lemma D.2, we know SA is convex. We show that
we can find a finite set of points in SA, such that every point in SA can be written as a convex
combination of these points. Note that, X = {X 1,X 2, . . . ,X |X |} is the set of all pure strategies
of player A and IA = {Xˆ
1, Xˆ 2, . . . , Xˆ |X |} is the set of points where Xˆ i = GA(X
i). Note that, IA
and X are finite sets. Every strategy of player A is either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy and
can be written as a convex combination of the pure strategies. Therefore, according to Lemma D.1
every point in SA is either in IA or can be written as a convex combination of points in IA. Hence,
SA forms a convex polyhedron in R
n(A).
Next we show that the number of vertices and facets of SA is O(2
poly(n)). Let xˆ be a vertex of
polyhedron SA and x be a strategy of player A such that GA(x) = xˆ. Since xˆ is a vertex of SA, it
cannot be written as a convex combination of other vertices of SA. If x is a mixed strategy, it can
be written as a convex combination of other strategies and according to Lemma D.1, GA(x) can be
written as convex combination of other points of SA. This implies that either x is a pure strategy
or there exists a pure strategy x′ such that GA(x
′) = xˆ. Therefore, the number of vertices of SA
is no more than the number of pure strategies of player A. Since each pure strategy of player A
is a partition of a units into k battlefields the number of pure strategies is no more than (a+ 1)k.
Thus, the number of vertices of SA is at most n(A)
n(A).
Let d ≤ n(A) be the dimension of SA. Since every facet of SA can be uniquely determined by
d vertices of SA, the number of facets is no more than(
|IA|
d
)
≤ (|IA|)
d ≤ (n(A)n(A))d ≤ n(A)(n(A)
2).
Proof of Lemma A.2: Note that the dimension of SA is not necessarily n(A). Let d be the
dimension of SA and H(SA) be the affine hull of SA. Since H(SA) is a d-dimensional subspace of
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R
n(A), it can be represented as the intersection of n(A)− d orthogonal hyperplanes. Let L be a set
of such hyperplanes. Let C be the set of all hyperplanes perpendicular to hyperplanes in L which
contain a facet of SA. We need Lemma D.3, Lemma D.4, Lemma D.5, and Lemma D.6 for proving
Lemma A.2.
Lemma D.3 There exists exactly one hyperplane perpendicular to all hyperplanes in L which con-
tains all points of a (d− 1)-dimensional subspace of H(SA).
Proof: Let O be the orthogonal basis of the (d − 1)-dimensional subspace and N be the set
of normal vectors of hyperplanes in L. Since every vector in O is in H(SA), all vectors in O are
orthogonal to all vectors in N . Therefore, the desired hyperplane should be orthogonal to all vectors
N ∪ O. Since |N ∪ O| = n(A) − 1 and all vectors in N ∪ O are pairwise orthogonal, there exists
exactly one hyperplane containing the subspace and perpendicular to all hyperplanes in L.
Lemma D.4 There exists exactly one hyperplane perpendicular to all hyperplanes of L which con-
tain all points of some facet f of SA.
Proof: Since f is a facet of SA, its dimension is d − 1. Therefore, its affine hull is a (d − 1)-
dimensional subspace of H(SA). Note that, a hyperplane contains f if and only if it contains
affine hull of f . Lemma D.3 states that there exists exactly one hyperplane perpendicular to
all hyperplanes of L that contains the affine hull of f . Hence, there exists a unique hyperplane
containing f which is perpendicular to all hyperplanes of L.
Lemma D.5 For every point xˆ ∈ H(SA) which is not in SA, there exists a hyperplane perpendicular
to all hyperplanes in L, which contains a facet of SA and separates xˆ from SA.
Proof: Consider a segment between xˆ and one point of SA. Since one endpoint of the segment
is in SA and the other one is not, it has intersection with at least one facet of SA, namely f . By
Lemma D.4, there exists one hyperplane which contains f and is perpendicular to hyperplanes in
L. This hyperplane has intersection with the segment and separates xˆ from SA.
Lemma D.6 Point xˆ ∈ Rn(A) is in SA if and only if all hyperplanes in L contain xˆ and no
hyperplane in C separates xˆ from SA.
Proof: Since SA is in the intersection of all hyperplanes in L, if xˆ ∈ SA it is also in all hyperplanes
in L and obviously no hyperplane in C separates xˆ from SA. Now suppose xˆ /∈ SA, if xˆ /∈ H(SA),
then xˆ is not in all hyperplanes of L, otherwise by Lemma D.5 there exists a hyperplane in C that
separates xˆ from SA.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma A.2. By Lemma D.6 we conclude that set of hyperplanes in
L and C are sufficient to formulate SA. We know |L| is at most n(A), and by Lemma D.4 we can
find out that |C| is equal to the number of facets of SA. Moreover Lemma A.1 states that |C| is
O(2poly(n)) which means |C|+ |L| ∈ O(2poly(n)).
E Approximating the payoff of the game
We can observe that in some dueling games the separation problem cannot be solved in polynomial
time. However, having a fixed error threshold, it is possible to approximately solve the separation
problem in polynomial time. In this section we present a technique for approximating the payoff
of the dueling games via providing an approximate solution for the separation problem.
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We say a (not necessarily feasible) point xˆ is an ǫ-solution of the LP in a bilinear dueling game
where there exists a feasible strategy point xˆ′ such that |xˆ − xˆ′| ≤ ǫ and the minimum payoff of
strategy xˆ differs by at most ǫ from that of the MinMax strategies. Remark that, in the separation
problem we are given a linear constraint α0, α1, . . . and are to find out whether there exists a
strategy point for a player which has the property α0 +
∑
i αixˆi ≥ 0. We say a separation oracle
solves this problem with approximation factor ǫ if it always finds such a point when there exists
a violating point having a distance of at least ǫ from the hyperplane. Note that, the approximate
oracle may not report a correct answer when the distance of all desired points to the hyperplane is
less than ǫ. We say a dueling game is polynomially ǫ-separable if we can approximately solve the
separation problem in polynomial time for every ǫ > 0. The following theorem provides a strong
tool for approximating the payoff of the game in an NE for a broad set of dueling games.
Theorem E.1 Let B be a bilinear dueling game ranging over [0, 1]n(A) × [0, 1]n(B) (i.e. SA ⊂
[0, 1]n(A) and SB ⊂ [0, 1]
n(B)) with payoff matrix M and n = max{n(A), n(B)}. If we can solve the
ǫ-separation problem in time f(ǫ, n) then we can find an ǫ-solution of the LP in time O(poly(n) ·
f(ǫ/β, n)), where β = max{1,
∑
i,j |Mi,j |}.
Proof: Suppose we solve LP 2 with Ellipsoid method using an ǫ/β-separating oracle instead of
the exact oracle and let xˆ be the solution we find. First we show that there exists at least one
feasible strategy xˆ′ such that |xˆ′ − xˆ| ≤ ǫ. Next, we will compare the minimum payoff of xˆ′ with
that of the MinMax strategies. Remark that, in order to determine whether or not xˆ is within the
set of feasible strategy points we solve the following linear program (which is the same as LP 5
from the proof of Lemma A.3) and see if there is any violating constraint.
α0 +
∑
j
αj xˆj < 0 (30)
α0 +
∑
j
αj vˆj ≥ 0 ∀vˆ ∈ IA
Since the ǫ/β-separating oracle does not report any violating constrains for xˆ, either there is no
violating constrain or the distance of xˆ from all violating hyperplanes is less than ǫ/β. Therefore
there exists a point xˆ′ in the set of feasible solution such that |xˆ′ − xˆ| ≤ ǫ/β ≤ ǫ.
Next, we compare the minimum payoff of strategy xˆ′ with the minimum payoff of the MinMax
strategies. From the previous argument we have |xˆ′ − xˆ| < ǫ/β. Since β =
∑
i,j |Mi,j |, we have
|(xˆM yˆ)− (xˆ′M yˆ)| < |xˆ′ − xˆ|.β < ǫ for each strategy yˆ of the second player. Moreover, since every
MinMax strategy is a potential solution of the linear program and xˆ is the solution which maximizes
the objective function, the minimum possible payoff off xˆ is not less than the minimum possible
payoff of the MinMax strategies. Thus, the difference between the minimum possible payoff of xˆ′
and that of the MinMax strategies is at most ǫ.
Since we’re using Ellipsoid method, the number of times we call the ǫ-separation oracle is poly(n),
hence the running time of the algorithm is O(poly(n) · f(ǫ/β, n)).
Note that, Theorem E.1 states if we can find an approximate solution of the separation problem
in polynomial time, then we can find an approximate solution of the LP in polynomial time as well.
Since an approximate solution may not necessarily be a feasible strategy point, it cannot be used
in order to characterize the properties of the MinMax strategies. However, we can approximate the
payoff of the players in an NE by computing the payoffs for the ǫ-solution of the LP.
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